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Introduction	  
	   This	  paper	  takes	  up	  an	  idea	  that	  has	  interested	  me	  for	  some	  years	  that,	  contrary	  to	  a	  very	  
widely	  shared	  assumption,	  a	  radically	  indeterministic	  metaphysics	  does	  provide	  a	  way	  of	  
understanding	  human	  freedom	  as	  a	  real	  and	  important	  feature	  of	  the	  world.	  	  However,	  whereas	  I	  
used	  to	  think	  of	  this	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  free	  will	  problem	  within	  the	  tradition	  of	  radical	  voluntarism,	  
I	  now	  prefer	  to	  present	  it	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  indeterminist	  compatibilism.	  	  In	  the	  most	  crucial	  
respects	  this	  position	  remains	  true	  to	  the	  voluntarist	  tradition,	  but	  in	  its	  current	  incarnation	  it	  aims	  
to	  capture	  the	  powerful	  intuitions	  that	  underlie	  compatibilist	  thinking.	  
	   The	  paper	  will	  begin	  with	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  the	  indeterministic	  metaphysics	  to	  which	  I	  
subscribe,	  and	  indicate	  some	  of	  the	  grounds	  for	  holding	  such	  a	  set	  of	  views.	  	  I	  shall	  then	  consider	  in	  a	  
general	  way	  how	  human	  autonomy	  could	  fit	  into	  such	  a	  metaphysical	  framework,	  paying	  some	  
attention	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  autonomy	  in	  the	  course	  of	  human	  ontogeny.	  	  In	  the	  
final	  section	  of	  the	  paper	  I	  shall	  explain	  the	  contrast	  between	  my	  earlier	  voluntarist	  understanding	  of	  
the	  issue	  and	  the	  indeterministic	  compatibilism	  I	  now	  prefer.	  	  This	  will	  include	  an	  explanation	  of	  
how,	  contrary	  to	  a	  natural	  suspicion,	  this	  position	  is	  not	  oxymoronic.	  	  This	  section	  will	  show	  how	  
indeterministic	  compatibilism	  captures	  both	  the	  commitment	  to	  genuine	  autonomy	  that	  has	  driven	  
much	  of	  the	  voluntarist	  tradition,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  powerful	  intuitions	  that	  have	  made	  
compatibilism	  so	  attractive	  to	  so	  many.	  
Indeterministic	  Metaphysics.	  
	  I	  am	  a	  committed	  indeterminist.	  	  In	  one	  sense,	  almost	  everyone	  is	  an	  indeterminist,	  of	  
course.	  	  We	  all	  know	  that	  certain	  physical	  processes,	  for	  example	  radioactive	  decay,	  are	  
indeterministic.	  While	  these	  processes	  happen	  with	  extremely	  precise	  probabilities,	  so	  that	  one	  can	  
say	  with	  great	  precision	  how	  many	  atoms	  in	  a	  lump	  of	  radioactive	  material	  will	  decay	  in	  a	  particular	  
time	  period,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  in	  principle	  no	  way	  of	  predicting	  the	  decay	  of	  a	  particular	  atom.	  	  
But	  without	  disputing	  this	  indeterminism	  of	  certain	  microscopic	  processes,	  most	  philosophers,	  I	  
think,	  still	  believe	  that	  determinism	  reasserts	  itself	  at	  the	  macroscopic	  level,	  just	  as	  the	  behaviour	  of	  
the	  radioactive	  lump	  is	  deterministic	  despite	  problems	  with	  individual	  atoms.	  
The	  indeterminism	  to	  which	  I	  subscribe	  is	  much	  more	  radical,	  and	  I	  suppose	  that	  such	  a	  
version	  remains	  an	  uncommon	  or	  even	  eccentric	  opinion.	  	  First,	  I	  think	  that	  indeterminism	  is	  rife	  
even	  at	  the	  macroscopic	  level;	  indeed	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  the	  normal	  default	  state	  of	  things.	  	  
Determinism	  is,	  I	  would	  argue,	  a	  rare	  achievement,	  occasionally	  approximated	  in	  the	  manufactures	  
of	  highly	  skilled	  engineers,	  or	  in	  wonderfully	  simple	  systems	  dominated	  by	  single	  causal	  principles,	  
such	  as	  the	  solar	  system.	  	  Moreover,	  I	  don’t	  think	  that	  this	  indeterminism	  is	  typically	  because	  the	  
laws	  that	  govern	  the	  behaviour	  of	  things	  are	  statistical	  rather	  than	  deterministic;	  rather,	  I	  doubt	  
whether	  for	  most	  things	  or	  systems	  of	  things	  there	  are	  typically	  any	  laws	  of	  any	  kind	  telling	  them	  
what	  to	  do.	  	  Order,	  in	  short,	  I	  see	  as	  an	  occasional	  and	  precious	  feature	  of	  the	  world,	  usually	  hard	  
won	  by	  us	  or	  by	  the	  aeons	  of	  evolutionary	  time.	  
I	  won’t,	  in	  this	  paper,	  attempt	  to	  provide	  a	  systematic	  defence	  of	  this	  general	  metaphysical	  
outlook.	  	  The	  reader	  who	  finds	  it	  incredible	  could	  either	  look	  up	  where	  I	  have	  argued	  for	  it	  in	  more	  
detail,1	  continue	  out	  of	  curiosity	  about	  what	  might	  be	  done	  with	  such	  a	  strange	  view,	  or	  give	  up.	  	  My	  
aim	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  make	  a	  different	  point,	  namely	  that	  contrary	  to	  a	  widely	  held	  assumption,	  
abandoning	  determinism	  does	  point	  the	  way	  to	  a	  solution	  of	  sorts	  to	  the	  traditional	  problem	  of	  free	  
will.	  Perhaps	  if	  this	  argument	  convinces,	  it	  will	  provide	  a	  reason	  to	  reconsider	  the	  grounds	  for	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determinist	  convictions.	  	  I	  have	  defended	  a	  position	  of	  this	  kind	  for	  some	  time,2	  but	  recently	  I	  have	  
been	  lead	  to	  reconceive	  this	  defence	  as	  a	  version	  not,	  as	  I	  used	  to	  think,	  of	  radical	  voluntarism,	  but	  
rather	  as	  a	  version	  of	  compatibilism.	  	  This	  will	  be	  explained	  in	  due	  course.	  	  But	  first	  I	  will	  elaborate	  
the	  general	  metaphysical	  view	  a	  bit	  further,	  and	  describe	  some	  consequences	  that	  are	  especially	  
important	  for	  understanding	  the	  argument	  about	  free	  will.	  
The	  only	  major	  point	  I	  will	  make	  here	  in	  favour	  of	  radical	  indeterminism	  is	  to	  ask	  why	  we	  
should	  suppose	  that	  the	  onus	  of	  proof	  should	  lie	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  some	  things	  happen	  without	  
being	  mandated	  by	  universal	  laws.	  	  The	  claim	  that	  everything	  happens	  in	  accordance	  with	  law	  is	  a	  
very	  strong	  one,	  and	  one	  might	  think	  that	  the	  onus	  should	  lie	  with	  the	  defender	  of	  such	  a	  strong,	  
positive	  thesis.	  	  Certainly	  we	  must	  acknowledge	  as	  much	  causal	  order	  as	  is	  necessary	  to	  account	  for	  
whatever	  regularities	  we	  find,	  and	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  exploiting	  these	  to	  produce	  even	  greater	  
regularity,	  as	  is	  evinced	  by	  our	  better	  machines	  and	  our	  most	  successful	  scientific	  experiments.	  	  But	  
while	  these	  force	  the	  acknowledgement	  of	  some	  order,	  the	  great	  difficulty	  of	  extracting	  practically	  
useful	  or	  theoretically	  illuminating	  order	  that	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  these	  enterprises	  surely	  speaks	  
against	  a	  ready	  assumption	  of	  complete	  and	  universal	  order.	  Certainly	  something	  more	  does	  need	  to	  
be	  said	  here	  about	  where	  whatever	  order	  there	  is	  in	  the	  world	  comes	  from	  if,	  as	  I	  have	  claimed,	  this	  
is	  far	  from	  universal.	  	  To	  this	  I	  next	  turn.	  	  
	   Implicit	  in	  my	  very	  brief	  explanation	  of	  why	  I	  am	  not	  a	  determinist	  is	  something	  like	  a	  
methodological	  principle:	  assume	  as	  much	  as	  is	  necessary	  to	  explain	  the	  empirical	  phenomena,	  in	  
this	  case	  what	  regularity	  there	  is,	  but	  no	  more.	  	  And	  the	  empirical	  reality,	  as	  I	  see	  it,	  is	  that	  regularity	  
is	  a	  fascinating	  but	  none	  too	  common	  phenomenon.	  	  I	  have	  mentioned	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  we	  
build,	  of	  the	  set-­‐ups	  we	  construct	  for	  scientific	  experiment,	  and	  the	  regularities	  of	  celestial	  
mechanics.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  crucial	  case,	  since	  it	  is	  the	  one	  under	  which	  we	  as	  possibly	  free	  agents	  fall,	  is	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that	  of	  living	  things.	  	  If,	  as	  is	  currently	  very	  common,	  we	  think	  of	  life	  processes	  as	  essentially	  similar	  
to	  machines,	  the	  realm	  of	  deterministic,	  machine-­‐like	  causality	  is	  beginning	  to	  expand	  rapidly.3	  
The	  minimal	  assumption	  needed	  to	  account	  or	  any	  of	  these	  regularities	  is	  that	  things	  have	  
(ceteris	  paribus)	  dispositions,	  or	  capacities.	  A	  paradigm	  for	  a	  scientifically	  interesting	  capacity	  might	  
be	  the	  disposition	  of	  massive	  objects	  to	  move	  at	  constant	  velocity	  in	  a	  straight	  line.	  	  This	  is	  of	  course	  
a	  much	  weaker	  assumption	  than	  the	  universal	  reign	  of	  law;	  and	  it	  might	  immediately	  be	  noted	  that	  
massive	  objects	  seldom	  do	  in	  fact	  move	  at	  constant	  velocity	  in	  a	  straight	  line.	  The	  exceptional	  case	  
of	  determination,	  in	  a	  world	  containing	  such	  capacities,	  is	  a	  set	  of	  constraints	  such	  that	  only	  one	  kind	  
of	  behaviour,	  one	  way	  that	  the	  relevant	  capacity	  or	  capacities	  can	  be	  exercised,	  is	  possible.	  So	  
suppose,	  for	  example,	  that	  an	  explosion	  is	  in	  general	  a	  largely	  indeterministic	  process	  in	  which	  a	  lot	  
of	  energy	  is	  dissipated	  very	  rapidly	  somehow	  and	  somewhere.	  If,	  however,	  we	  confine	  the	  explosion	  
to	  the	  interior	  of	  a	  sufficiently	  strong	  metal	  cylinder	  containing	  a	  piston	  capable	  of	  moving	  a	  certain	  
distance	  along	  its	  length,	  then	  we	  can	  be	  certain	  that	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  energy	  of	  the	  
explosion	  will	  be	  transmitted	  into	  the	  motion	  of	  the	  piston;	  very	  roughly	  speaking,	  there	  is	  nowhere	  
else	  for	  it	  to	  go.	  	  This	  is	  a	  simple	  example	  of	  how	  we	  constrain	  capacities	  (in	  this	  case	  the	  capacity	  to	  
generate	  a	  lot	  of	  energy	  in	  a	  very	  short	  time)	  to	  produce	  highly	  reliable	  behaviour.	  	  A	  great	  many	  
other	  such	  constraints	  need	  to	  be	  ingeniously	  engineered	  if	  the	  motion	  of	  the	  piston	  is	  going	  to	  be	  
translated	  into	  the	  rotation	  of	  the	  wheel,	  and	  a	  great	  deal	  more	  still	  is	  needed	  to	  turn	  this	  into	  a	  
usable	  vehicle.	  	  But	  I	  propose	  that	  the	  model	  of	  constraining	  the	  exercise	  of	  capacities	  will	  work	  well	  
throughout	  this	  further	  elaboration	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  a	  familiar	  machine.	  
I	  should	  note	  in	  passing	  that	  I	  am	  quite	  happy	  to	  admit	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  capacities	  may	  
be	  fully	  amenable	  to	  reductive	  explanation.	  	  I	  certainly	  don’t	  mean	  to	  assert	  that	  this	  is	  universally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  here	  the	  ‘new	  mechanism’,	  for	  which	  the	  classic	  reference	  is	  P.	  Machamer,	  L.	  
Darden,	  and	  C.	  F.	  Craver,	  “Thinking	  about	  Mechanisms”,	  Philosophy	  of	  Science,	  67	  (2000),	  pp.	  1-­‐25.	  
See	  also	  S.	  Glennan,	  “Mechanisms	  and	  the	  Nature	  of	  Causation,”	  Erkenntnis,	  44	  (1996),	  pp.	  49-­‐71.	  
the	  case,	  and	  in	  fact	  I	  don’t	  believe	  that	  it	  is,	  but	  for	  present	  purposes	  I	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  deny	  it.	  	  
What	  I	  do	  deny	  is	  that	  there	  could	  be	  a	  fully	  reductive	  account	  of	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  
capacity	  will	  be	  exercised.	  	  As	  all	  the	  examples	  so	  far	  have	  illustrated,	  that	  will	  always	  or	  at	  least	  
typically	  depend	  on	  additional	  circumstances	  beyond	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  entity	  to	  which	  the	  capacity	  
is	  attributed.	  	  Of	  course	  one	  may	  attempt	  at	  that	  point	  to	  extend	  the	  range	  of	  the	  phenomena	  on	  
which	  the	  reduction	  is	  proposed	  to	  be	  based.	  	  But	  this	  will	  bring	  in	  capacities	  of	  the	  additional	  parts	  
of	  the	  system,	  the	  exercise	  of	  which	  will	  again	  typically	  depend	  on	  further	  properties	  beyond	  the	  
extended	  system.	  	  To	  summarise	  the	  problem,	  a	  truly	  closed	  system	  may	  perhaps	  be	  amenable	  to	  
fully	  reductive	  explanation,	  and	  this	  is	  why	  the	  process	  of	  making	  reliable	  machines	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  
one	  of	  approximating	  in	  many	  respects	  the	  production	  of	  a	  closed	  system.	  	  However	  in	  nature	  all	  
systems	  are	  open,	  and	  reductionist	  explanation	  is	  mainly	  limited	  to	  explaining	  how	  things	  have	  the	  
capacities	  they	  do.	  	  It	  may	  possibly	  be	  that	  reductionism	  is	  true	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  what	  happens	  
always	  supervenes	  on	  the	  total	  physical	  state	  of	  the	  universe;	  this	  is	  hardly,	  however,	  a	  possibility	  of	  
much	  relevance	  to	  empirical	  science.	  	  
I	  have	  mentioned	  the	  solar	  system	  a	  couple	  of	  times	  as	  an	  example	  of	  an	  untypically	  
deterministic	  system,	  and	  I	  should	  say	  a	  little	  more	  about	  the	  general	  topic	  of	  physical	  law	  to	  which	  
this	  example	  has	  had	  such	  great	  historical	  significance.	  Let	  me	  introduce	  that	  discussion	  with	  a	  highly	  
pertinent	  quote	  from	  Elizabeth	  Anscombe:	  
“The	  high	  success	  of	  Newton's	  astronomy	  was	  in	  one	  way	  an	  intellectual	  disaster:	  it	  
produced	  an	  illusion	  from	  which	  we	  tend	  still	  to	  suffer.	  This	  illusion	  was	  created	  by	  the	  
circumstance	  that	  Newton's	  mechanics	  had	  a	  good	  model	  in	  the	  solar	  system.	  For	  this	  gave	  
the	  impression	  that	  we	  had	  here	  an	  ideal	  of	  scientific	  explanation;	  whereas	  the	  truth	  was,	  
it	  was	  mere	  obligingness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  solar	  system,	  by	  having	  had	  so	  peaceful	  a	  
history	  in	  recorded	  time,	  to	  provide	  such	  a	  model.”4	  
It	  may	  even	  be	  that	  part	  of	  the	  legacy	  of	  this	  illusion	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  still	  underlies	  so	  many	  
reductionist	  intuitions,	  the	  belief	  in	  the	  completeness	  of	  physics.	  	  Is	  this	  view	  a	  problem	  for	  my	  
indeterministic,	  disordered,	  or	  dappled	  view	  of	  the	  casual	  order?	  	  Yes.	  	  If	  physics	  is	  the	  theory	  that	  
applies	  to	  all	  the	  stuff	  in	  the	  world,	  for	  physics	  to	  be	  complete	  is	  for	  all	  that	  stuff	  to	  be	  law-­‐governed;	  
and	  assuming,	  as	  I	  do,	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  the	  world	  that	  is	  not	  made	  of	  physical	  stuff	  then	  under	  
some	  description,	  at	  least,	  everything	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  physics.	  	  These	  laws	  may	  perhaps	  be	  
indeterministic,	  but	  here	  is	  also	  where	  it	  is	  often	  argued	  that	  the	  source	  of	  indeterminism	  in	  a	  
complete	  physics,	  quantum	  mechanics,	  is	  increasingly	  negligible	  as	  we	  approach	  the	  macroscopic	  
world,	  and	  determinism	  is	  at	  least	  indefinitely	  closely	  approximated.	  	  So	  should	  we	  believe	  that	  
physics	  is	  complete?	  	  I	  am	  again	  happy	  to	  put	  a	  lot	  of	  weight	  on	  an	  onus	  of	  proof	  argument:	  why	  
should	  we	  believe	  the	  claims	  of	  a	  theory	  to	  govern	  phenomena	  in	  principle	  in	  a	  realm	  (the	  
macroscopic	  world	  generally)	  in	  which	  there	  is	  no	  expectation	  whatever	  that	  there	  could	  ever	  be	  
evidence	  of	  their	  successful	  application?	  	  Of	  course	  the	  enthusiasts	  for	  physical	  law	  will	  say	  that	  the	  
formalisms	  they	  deploy	  work	  perfectly	  wherever	  they	  can	  be	  applied	  in	  practice,	  and	  they	  apply	  in	  
principle	  to	  everything.	  	  But	  this	  is	  a	  feeble	  argument.	  	  There	  are	  many	  features	  of	  the	  macroscopic	  
entities	  and	  processes	  to	  which	  these	  laws	  cannot	  in	  practice	  be	  applied	  that	  are	  not	  true	  of	  those	  
things	  to	  which	  they	  can.	  	  There	  are	  differences	  in	  size,	  complexity,	  and	  so	  on,	  which	  may	  perfectly	  
make	  the	  laws	  inapplicable	  in	  principle	  as	  well	  as	  in	  practice.	  	  The	  evidence-­‐free	  hypothesis	  that	  a	  set	  
of	  laws	  that	  has	  been	  found	  empirically	  applicable	  to	  one	  kind	  of	  phenomenon	  should	  be	  assumed	  
to	  apply	  to	  a	  much	  wider	  range	  of	  phenomena	  for	  which	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  of	  such	  applicability	  
extant	  or	  foreseeable,	  is	  surely	  the	  sort	  of	  hypothesis	  that	  even	  the	  slightest	  reflection	  on	  the	  
hazards	  of	  induction	  should	  lead	  us	  to	  treat	  with	  deep	  suspicion.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  G.	  E.	  M.	  Anscombe,	  Causality	  and	  Determination.	  An	  Inaugural	  Lecture,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1971,	  p.	  20. 	  
	   One	  last	  piece	  of	  philosophical	  background	  needs	  to	  be	  considered	  before	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  
question	  of	  free	  will	  itself.	  	  This	  is	  the	  vexed	  topic	  of	  downward	  causation.	  	  Can	  the	  behaviour	  of	  
anything	  be	  caused	  by	  the	  wider	  system	  of	  which	  it	  is	  part?	  	  Given	  my	  view	  that	  causation	  is	  a	  scarce	  
and	  special	  phenomenon,	  I	  have	  generally	  thought	  that	  this	  should	  be	  no	  problem.	  	  So,	  anticipating	  
the	  case	  in	  point,	  if	  humans	  are	  complex	  systems	  with	  exceptional	  capacities	  to	  impose	  causal	  order,	  
then	  it	  should	  be	  no	  surprise	  that	  this	  causal	  order	  should	  encompass	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  system:	  when	  
I	  raise	  my	  arm,	  I,	  the	  whole	  system,	  cause	  a	  part,	  my	  arm,	  to	  rise.	  However,	  I	  am	  increasingly	  
sympathetic	  to	  the	  suggestion	  that	  it	  is	  better	  not	  to	  describe	  this	  issue	  in	  causal	  terms	  at	  all.	  	  Carl	  
Craver	  and	  William	  Bechtel5	  (2007)	  provide	  a	  convincing	  argument	  that	  causation	  works	  neither	  
upwards—smaller	  things	  causing	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  wholes	  of	  which	  they	  are	  parts—or	  
downwards,	  but	  applies	  properly	  only	  to	  interactions	  at	  a	  particular	  level	  of	  structural	  complexity.	  	  
The	  movements	  of	  parts	  or	  wholes	  consequent	  on	  the	  behaviour	  of	  wholes	  or	  parts,	  respectively,	  
they	  call	  “mechanistically	  mediated	  effects”:	  
“Mechanistically	  mediated	  effects	  are	  hybrids	  of	  constitutive	  and	  causal	  relations	  in	  a	  
mechanism,	  where	  the	  constitutive	  relations	  are	  interlevel,	  and	  the	  causal	  relations	  are	  
exclusively	  intralevel.	  Appeal	  to	  top-­‐down	  causation	  seems	  spooky	  or	  incoherent	  when	  it	  
cannot	  be	  explicated	  in	  terms	  of	  mechanistically	  mediated	  effects.”6	  	  
In	  essence,	  the	  point,	  as	  I	  understand	  it,	  is	  just	  that	  we	  should	  separate	  the	  truism	  that	  parts	  and	  
wholes	  cannot	  help	  but	  coordinate	  their	  actions,	  from	  the	  substantive	  question	  whether	  there	  can	  
be	  autonomous	  systems	  at	  higher	  levels,	  as	  opposed	  to	  merely	  mechanistically	  mediated	  effects	  of	  
lower	  level	  systems.	  Again,	  if	  I	  am	  right	  that	  causality,	  or	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  is	  far	  from	  universal,	  there	  
should	  be	  no	  problem	  in	  admitting	  such	  autonomous	  higher	  level	  systems.	  Craver	  and	  Bechtel’s	  
analysis,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  this	  is	  at	  any	  rate	  a	  possibility	  that	  should	  not	  be	  ruled	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  C.	  F.	  Craver	  and	  W.	  Bechtel,	  “Top-­‐Down	  Causation	  Without	  Top-­‐Down	  Causes,”	  Biology	  and	  
Philosophy	  22	  (2007),	  p.	  547-­‐563.	  
6	  Ibid.,	  p.	  547.	  
out	  merely	  by	  reflection	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  causation	  or	  the	  intuition	  of	  spookiness	  that	  some	  people	  
find	  so	  strongly	  associated	  with	  downward	  causation.	  
The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Free	  Will	  
Voluntarists	  have	  generally	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  insist	  on	  there	  being	  some	  kind	  of	  gaps	  in	  the	  
surrounding	  causal	  order	  that	  leave	  space	  for	  genuinely	  free	  actions,	  and	  the	  metaphysical	  views	  I	  
have	  just	  sketched	  plainly	  have	  no	  problem	  meeting	  this	  need.	  	  They	  have	  not,	  however,	  generally	  
wanted	  to	  think	  of	  the	  voluntary	  acts	  that	  take	  advantage	  of	  these	  gaps	  as	  being	  indeterministic	  in	  
the	  sense	  exemplified	  by	  phenomena	  such	  as	  radioactive	  decay.	  	  Thinking	  of	  free	  human	  acts	  as	  
merely	  random	  is	  probably	  even	  less	  attractive	  to	  ideals	  of	  human	  autonomy	  than	  is	  thinking	  of	  
them	  as	  deterministically	  caused	  by	  some	  phenomena	  far	  beyond	  the	  control	  or	  even	  knowledge	  of	  
the	  agent,	  such	  as	  the	  transactions	  of	  microphysical	  particles.	  	  What	  the	  voluntarist	  wants	  is	  some	  
kind	  of	  determination	  not	  only	  of	  a	  different	  kind	  from	  that	  in	  the	  surrounding	  causal	  nexus,	  but	  also	  
somehow	  independent	  of	  it.	  	  Attempts	  to	  provide	  such	  a	  thing	  have	  generally	  involved	  some	  kind	  of	  
agent	  causation,	  a	  way	  of	  seeing	  agents	  as	  capable	  of	  initiating	  causal	  chains	  in	  some	  way	  
independent	  of	  the	  causal	  nexus	  in	  which	  they	  are	  embedded.	  	  My	  past	  discussions	  of	  this	  topic7	  
have	  tended	  to	  follow	  this	  line,	  and	  indeed	  I	  do	  find	  compelling	  the	  idea	  that	  human	  agents,	  by	  
virtue	  of	  the	  remarkable	  organisation	  of	  their	  parts,	  can	  impose	  causal	  order	  on	  their	  more	  chaotic	  
surroundings.	  	  However,	  I	  have	  recently	  come	  to	  see	  that	  a	  better	  way	  of	  presenting	  my	  views,	  and	  
one	  that	  avoids	  the	  somewhat	  opaque	  concept	  of	  agent	  causation,	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  indeterministic	  
compatibilism.	  	  The	  appearance	  of	  oxymoron	  in	  this	  phrase	  will	  be	  dispelled,	  I	  hope,	  in	  what	  follows.	  
But	  before	  I	  explain	  this	  any	  further,	  I	  want	  to	  talk	  a	  little	  about	  the	  development	  of	  autonomy	  from	  
a	  biological	  perspective.	  
It	  is	  still	  often	  supposed	  that	  the	  development	  of	  a	  human	  from	  zygote	  to	  maturity	  and	  
beyond	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  unfolding	  of	  a	  programme	  encoded	  in	  the	  genome.	  	  But	  it	  is	  now	  quite	  clear	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  See	  references	  in	  note	  2,	  above.	  
this	  is	  not	  the	  case8,	  and	  that	  human	  development	  is	  a	  flexible	  process	  requiring	  access	  to	  a	  diverse	  
range	  of	  resources	  including	  as	  well	  as	  the	  genome,	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  other	  chemicals	  and	  structures	  in	  
the	  maternal	  egg,	  much	  that	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  uterine	  environment,	  and	  subsequent	  to	  birth	  a	  
great	  deal	  of	  nurture	  and	  cognitive	  enrichment,	  provided	  by	  parents,	  hospitals,	  schools,	  etc.9	  If	  there	  
is	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  autonomy,	  it	  emerges	  at	  some	  point	  in	  this	  developmental	  process,	  the	  life	  cycle:	  
fetuses	  surely	  don’t	  have	  it;	  well-­‐educated	  adults	  do,	  if	  anything	  does.	  	  It	  would	  be	  nice	  to	  know	  
when	  this	  happens,	  but	  perhaps	  more	  fundamental	  is	  the	  question,	  what	  it	  is	  for	  this	  to	  happen.	  	  	  
As	  any	  organism	  develops,	  it	  acquires	  a	  range	  of	  capacities:	  capacities	  to	  capture	  and	  
process	  resources	  from	  the	  environment,	  to	  reproduce,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  In	  the	  human	  case,	  the	  range	  of	  
these	  capacities	  can	  be	  extremely	  large.	  	  Humans	  acquire	  abilities	  to	  read,	  write	  and	  reason;	  to	  
interact	  with	  one	  another	  in	  a	  range	  of	  playful	  and	  serious	  ways;	  to	  speak	  languages,	  operate	  
machines,	  play	  musical	  instruments,	  etc.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  relatively	  simple	  organisms	  these	  capacities	  
can	  give	  rise	  to	  good	  deal	  of	  causal	  regularity.	  	  When	  a	  caterpillar	  emerges	  from	  the	  egg	  on	  a	  
suitable	  vegetable	  substrate,	  equipped	  with	  the	  proper	  array	  of	  mouth	  parts,	  digestive	  equipment,	  
and	  so	  on	  to	  feed,	  it	  will	  very	  predictably	  munch	  away	  at	  the	  poor	  plant	  until	  it	  has	  acquired	  and	  
processed	  enough	  chemical	  resources	  to	  pupate.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  when	  a	  domestic	  cat	  has	  
acquired	  the	  ability	  to	  catch	  mice,	  there	  is	  little	  reason	  to	  think	  any	  deterministic	  cause	  forces	  it	  to	  
pursue	  mice	  on	  any	  particular	  cue.	  	  My	  cat,	  at	  any	  rate,	  is	  often	  too	  lazy	  to	  go	  out	  and	  catch	  
anything,	  especially	  if	  the	  weather	  is	  bad.	  	  In	  other	  moods,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  he	  will	  in	  a	  remarkably	  
short	  time	  bring	  in	  a	  fairly	  substantial	  cross	  section	  of	  the	  small	  vertebrates	  that	  live	  in	  our	  vicinity.	  	  
If	  this	  is	  the	  acting	  out	  of	  a	  causally	  determined	  routine	  it	  is	  far	  from	  obviously	  so.	  Of	  course,	  
extremely	  well-­‐ordered	  capacities	  are	  deployed	  in	  the	  process	  of	  slaughtering	  these	  unfortunate	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  See,	  for	  example,	  S.	  B.	  Barnes	  and	  J.	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  Genomes	  and	  What	  to	  Make	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  Them,	  Chicago:	  Chicago	  
University	  Press,	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9	  For	  a	  range	  of	  insightful	  discussions	  of	  the	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  perspective	  assumed	  here,	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  and	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creatures;	  it	  is	  just	  that	  whether	  they	  will	  be	  deployed	  at	  all,	  or	  whether	  they	  will	  be	  used	  for	  a	  long	  
period	  of	  amusement	  at	  the	  victim’s	  expense	  or	  merely	  for	  a	  quick	  kill	  and	  a	  snack	  are	  highly	  variable	  
from	  instance	  to	  instance.	  	  
In	  the	  human	  case,	  at	  any	  rate,	  the	  vision	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  one	  or	  some	  among	  the	  
repertoire	  of	  capacities	  being	  elicited	  deterministically	  in	  response	  to	  particular	  features	  of	  a	  
situation	  seems	  incredible.	  	  The	  relevant	  kind	  of	  causal	  regularity	  supposes	  a	  systematic	  response	  to	  
an	  environmental	  cue.	  	  But	  more	  complex	  organisms,	  and	  especially	  humans,	  respond	  to	  their	  
environments	  not	  as	  reflexive	  reactions	  to	  experienced	  conditions,	  but	  teleologically,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  
the	  production	  of	  some	  among	  a	  range	  of	  desired	  outcomes.	  	  (Even	  for	  my	  cat,	  desired	  outcomes	  
include,	  at	  least,	  amusement	  and	  nutrition.)	  Humans	  not	  only	  acquire	  large	  numbers	  of	  capacities,	  
abilities	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  world	  in	  highly	  diverse	  ways,	  but	  can	  also	  increase	  the	  numbers	  of	  their	  
goals.	  	  Although	  the	  contemporary	  office	  worker	  might,	  at	  one	  level	  of	  abstraction,	  claim	  the	  sole	  
goal	  of	  emptying	  her	  email	  inbox,	  the	  experience	  of	  confronting	  a	  typical	  inbox	  is	  of	  confronting	  a	  
range	  of	  different	  problems	  not	  all	  of	  which	  can	  be	  solved	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  Particular	  events—the	  
arrival	  of	  a	  new	  email,	  for	  instance—may	  provide	  particular	  opportunities	  to	  resolve	  one	  among	  
these	  various	  problems.	  	  Humans,	  whether	  working	  at	  computers,	  making	  works	  of	  art,	  tending	  a	  
smallholding,	  or	  whatever,	  will	  typically	  have	  diverse	  goals	  and	  diverse	  possible	  means	  of	  achieving	  
those	  goals.	  Any	  of	  such	  means	  will	  typically	  depend	  on	  the	  exercise	  of	  several	  or	  many	  of	  the	  
capacities	  that	  they	  have	  acquired	  over	  decades	  of	  development.	  Humans	  thus	  take	  flexibility	  and	  
the	  possibility	  of	  choice	  between	  actions	  to	  an	  unprecedented	  level.	  And	  human	  intelligence	  (itself	  
an	  exceedingly	  complex	  set	  of	  capacities)	  makes	  possible	  both	  the	  formulation	  of	  goals	  and	  the	  
discernment	  of	  routes	  by	  which	  they	  can	  be	  achieved.	  
All	  these	  choices,	  between	  ends	  and	  between	  means,	  could	  in	  principle	  be	  conceived	  on	  a	  
quasi-­‐hydraulic	  model.	  	  Different	  ends	  would	  have	  different	  pressures,	  modified	  by	  the	  assessment	  
of	  the	  probability	  that	  particular	  means	  would	  achieve	  them;	  the	  greatest	  pressure	  would	  determine	  
action.	  	  A	  first	  response	  to	  this,	  or	  no	  doubt	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  possible	  variant,	  is	  that	  only	  the	  
commitment	  to	  the	  universal	  presence	  of	  determining	  causes,	  a	  commitment	  I	  have	  explicitly	  
disavowed,	  could	  draw	  one	  to	  such	  a	  picture.	  	  And	  this	  is	  because	  surely	  the	  picture	  is	  
psychologically	  quite	  implausible.	  	  Consider	  the	  exercise	  of	  will	  in	  a	  case	  where	  akrasia	  is	  a	  pressing	  
option.	  	  One	  might	  think	  of	  this	  as	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  composition	  of	  competing	  forces,	  but	  
though	  talk	  of	  strength	  of	  will	  and	  weakness	  of	  will	  might	  encourage	  such	  a	  model,	  it	  is	  surely	  too	  
simple.	  	  When	  a	  principle	  (I	  have	  decided	  to	  become	  a	  non-­‐smoker,	  say)	  confronts	  an	  occasion	  for	  
akrasia	  (a	  friend	  lights	  a	  cigarette	  while	  we	  are	  enjoying	  a	  drink	  together),	  this	  is	  certainly	  not	  
experienced	  as	  a	  conflict	  between	  desires.	  	  Desire	  is	  all	  on	  one	  side;	  the	  motivation	  to	  act	  in	  
accordance	  with	  a	  principle,	  though	  it	  may	  be	  entirely	  decisive,	  is	  something	  different.	  	  Although	  
Kant’s	  conception	  of	  free	  action	  as	  action	  in	  accordance	  with	  moral	  duty	  seems	  excessively	  severe,	  a	  
slightly	  less	  demanding	  idea	  of	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  commitment	  to	  principles	  or	  goals	  even	  
despite	  immediate	  desires	  to	  the	  contrary	  surely	  captures	  something	  central	  to	  the	  conception	  of	  
autonomy.	  	  I	  shall	  try	  to	  make	  clearer	  what	  this	  might	  be	  in	  the	  final	  section	  of	  this	  paper.	  
Voluntarism	  vs.	  Compatibilism	  	  
	  
Let	  me	  recapitulate	  the	  story	  so	  far.	  	  I	  see	  causal	  order	  as	  scarce	  rather	  than	  omnipresent,	  but	  as	  
exceptionally	  densely	  realised	  by	  organisms	  and	  especially	  humans.	  	  Humans	  develop	  multiple	  and	  
extremely	  sophisticated	  capacities	  throughout	  their	  ontogeny	  and	  become	  the	  densest	  and	  most	  
diverse	  concentrations	  of	  causal	  capacity	  in	  our	  experience.	  	  Humans	  can	  therefore	  impose	  order	  on	  
their	  surroundings	  by	  acting	  in	  ways	  intended	  precisely	  to	  do	  so.	  Unless	  you	  are	  reading	  these	  words	  
in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  wilderness	  hike,	  the	  chances	  are	  that	  a	  casual	  glance	  at	  your	  immediate	  
surroundings	  will	  provide	  compelling	  evidence	  of	  the	  ordering	  powers	  of	  humans.	  	  This	  does	  not	  yet	  
amount	  to	  autonomy;	  fully	  deterministic	  mechanisms	  could	  perhaps	  impose	  order	  on	  their	  
environment,	  though	  perhaps	  as	  an	  empirical	  fact	  they	  could	  only	  do	  this	  if	  they	  were	  thereby	  
realising	  the	  intentions	  of	  a	  designer.	  But	  we	  at	  least	  have	  more	  promising	  materials	  for	  an	  account	  
of	  autonomy	  than	  are	  provided	  by	  traditional	  determinisms.	  
In	  my	  earlier	  work	  I	  presented	  this	  picture	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  voluntarism,	  which	  
assumed,	  though	  did	  not	  really	  explain	  in	  much	  detail,	  some	  kind	  of	  agent	  causation.	  	  	  Humans,	  on	  
such	  a	  view,	  are	  a	  kind	  of	  miniature	  first	  cause,	  sending	  ripples	  of	  effect	  into	  the	  world	  as	  they	  pass	  
through	  it.	  	  	  I	  don’t	  think	  this	  is	  wrong,	  but	  it	  is	  rather	  unhelpful.	  	  What	  determines	  what	  effects	  the	  
passing	  human	  launches	  on	  the	  environment?	  	  Is	  this	  just	  a	  matter	  of	  whim?	  	  In	  which	  case	  we	  are	  
little	  better	  off	  than	  with	  the	  account	  of	  free	  action	  as	  pure	  randomness.	  
Though	  I	  don’t	  mean	  to	  suggest	  that	  I	  have	  discovered	  a	  fatal	  flaw	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  
incompatibilist	  voluntarism	  just	  sketched,	  recent	  work	  by	  John	  Perry10	  convinced	  me	  that	  a	  much	  
better	  solution	  would	  be	  an	  indeterministic	  compatibilism,	  as	  I	  shall	  now	  explain.	  	  The	  first	  thing	  that	  
is	  needed	  is	  to	  dispel	  the	  air	  of	  oxymoron.	  	  For	  Perry,	  compatibilism	  is	  not	  the	  compatibility	  of	  
voluntary	  action	  with	  a	  necessarily	  deterministic	  world	  order,	  but	  just	  with	  the	  normal	  causal	  order.	  	  
Recalling	  Hume’s	  classic	  statement	  of	  compatibilism,	  we	  might	  immediately	  note	  that,	  although	  
there	  are	  passages	  that	  suggest	  that	  Hume	  may	  very	  well	  have	  been	  a	  determinist,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  
main	  crux	  of	  his	  argument	  either.	  	  Certainly	  Hume	  stresses	  that	  in	  specific	  cases	  human	  behaviour	  
may	  be	  as	  predictable	  as	  anything	  else.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  reflection	  that:	  “A	  prisoner	  who	  
has	  neither	  money	  nor	  interest,	  discovers	  the	  impossibility	  of	  his	  escape,	  as	  well	  when	  he	  considers	  
the	  obstinacy	  of	  the	  gaoler,	  as	  the	  walls	  and	  bars	  with	  which	  he	  is	  surrounded.”11	  As	  described	  in	  my	  
general	  remarks	  about	  human	  capacities,	  the	  gaoler	  has	  acquired	  not	  only	  the	  necessary	  capacities	  
to	  ensure	  my	  incarceration,	  but	  even	  the	  firm	  commitment	  to	  the	  goal	  of	  doing	  so.	  	  He	  can	  be	  relied	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Perry,	  John.	  “Wretched	  subterfuge:	  a	  defense	  of	  the	  compatibilism	  of	  freedom	  and	  natural	  
causation”.	  Proceedings	  and	  Addresses	  of	  the	  APA	  2010;	  84:93-­‐113.	  Perry	  does	  not,	  I	  should	  stress,	  
call	  himself	  a	  compatibilist	  indeterminist,	  or	  indeed	  any	  other	  kind	  of	  indeterminist.	  	  His	  work	  does,	  
rather,	  make	  clear	  how	  the	  important	  benefits	  of	  compatibilism	  that	  have	  been	  stressed	  since	  David	  
Hume	  do	  not	  require	  a	  deterministic	  framework.	  
11	  Hume,	  David	  (1748).	  An	  Enquiry	  Concerning	  Human	  Understanding,	  	  section	  8,	  part	  1.	  	  
upon	  to	  adopt	  whatever	  plan	  of	  action	  seems	  best	  suited	  to	  pursuing	  this	  end.	  But	  the	  situation	  
Hume	  describes	  is	  as	  readily	  compatible	  with	  the	  metaphysics	  presented	  in	  this	  paper	  as	  with	  a	  
deterministic	  one.	  	  Gaolers	  are	  the	  sorts	  of	  people	  who	  are	  very	  unlikely	  to	  take	  pity	  on	  their	  charges	  
and	  just	  let	  them	  go.	  	  	  
Perry	  develops	  the	  crucial	  idea	  for	  the	  present	  discussion	  by	  considering	  the	  phrase,	  
notorious	  in	  discussions	  of	  the	  topic,	  “I	  could	  have	  done	  otherwise”12.	  Generally	  this	  phrase	  is	  taken	  
to	  encapsulate	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  compatibilist:	  if	  I	  acted	  freely,	  it	  is	  said,	  surely	  I	  could	  have	  done	  
otherwise.	  	  But	  if	  determinism	  is	  true,	  then	  it	  is	  never	  the	  case	  that	  I	  could	  have	  done	  otherwise.	  	  So	  
freedom	  is	  not	  compatible	  with	  determinism;	  it	  is	  rather	  the	  “wretched	  subterfuge”	  of	  Perry’s	  title	  
(the	  phrase	  is	  borrowed	  from	  Kant).	  	  	  
Perry	  proposes	  that	  the	  anti-­‐compatibilist	  argument	  trades	  on	  an	  ambiguity	  in	  the	  
interpretation	  of	  ‘I	  could’.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  I	  may	  mean,	  (1)	  “My	  capacities	  do	  not	  preclude	  my	  
having	  done	  otherwise.	  I	  am	  causally	  competent	  to	  act	  or	  not	  act.”	  	  This	  is	  true	  of	  the	  gaoler.	  	  He	  is	  
quite	  capable	  of	  operating	  locks,	  opening	  doors,	  and	  so	  on,	  and	  could	  if	  he	  chose,	  release	  the	  
prisoner.	  	  In	  fact	  he	  is	  probably	  better	  placed	  to	  do	  so	  than	  anyone	  else.	  	  But	  the	  incompatibilist	  
assumes	  a	  quite	  different	  interpretation,	  something	  like,	  (2)	  “I	  might	  have	  done	  otherwise	  even	  
though	  it	  would	  have	  been	  entirely	  contrary	  to	  my	  ends,	  principles,	  etc.”	  	  Note	  the	  innocent	  shift	  
from	  ‘could’	  to	  ‘might’.	  	  If	  we	  replaced	  ‘might’	  with	  ‘could’	  in	  (2)	  it	  seems	  unexceptionable;	  it	  is	  just	  
another	  way	  of	  saying	  what	  is	  expressed	  by	  (1).	  	  But	  ‘might’	  here	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  some	  definite	  
probability	  of	  my	  doing	  something	  contrary	  to	  my	  ends,	  principles,	  etc.	  	  Why	  should	  we	  accept	  this?	  	  
Doing	  something	  contrary	  to	  my	  goals,	  principles,	  etc.	  is	  what	  is	  generally	  referred	  to	  as	  
akrasia,	  or	  weakness	  of	  will.	  	  In	  a	  broadly	  Kantian	  vein,	  it	  is	  generally	  considered	  exactly	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  There	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  interesting	  discussion	  of	  this	  question,	  which	  the	  present	  paper	  overlooks	  at	  some	  
serious	  risk.	  	  In	  particular,	  Eleonore	  Stump,	  who	  has	  provided	  an	  interpretation	  of	  Aquinas	  that	  is	  in	  many	  ways	  
very	  congenial	  to	  the	  position	  developed	  here,	  argues	  that	  voluntarism	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  committed	  to	  the	  
possibility	  of	  the	  agent	  acting	  otherwise	  (see	  E.	  Stump,	  “Persons,	  Identification,	  and	  Freedom,”	  Philosophical	  
Topics	  24	  (1966),	  pp.	  183-­‐214).	  	  I	  think	  Stump	  would	  understand	  the	  position	  defended	  here	  as	  a	  version	  of	  
voluntarism.	  	  
antithesis	  of	  autonomy.	  	  Strength	  of	  will,	  the	  causal	  tendency	  to	  do	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  the	  
goals	  to	  which	  one	  is	  committed,	  is	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  a	  condition	  of	  genuine	  autonomy.	  	  So	  the	  
possibility	  of	  not	  doing	  what	  my	  ends	  dictate,	  of	  exhibiting	  akrasia,	  sometimes	  licenses	  statements	  
such	  as	  (2),	  but	  surely	  not	  always.	  	  The	  gaoler	  may	  well	  have	  no	  tendency	  at	  all	  to	  deviate	  from	  his	  
professional	  responsibility,	  and	  it	  is	  just	  not	  true	  that	  he	  might	  have	  done	  otherwise.	  	  Perry	  
illustrates	  this	  point	  with	  a	  less	  weighty	  example.	  He	  invites	  us	  to	  imagine	  (or	  if	  we	  have	  the	  good	  
fortune	  to	  hear	  the	  spoken	  version	  of	  his	  paper,	  to	  observe)	  that	  he	  is	  confronted	  with	  some	  
Brussels	  sprouts,	  a	  vegetable	  which,	  he	  informs	  us,	  he	  detests.	  	  Might	  he	  nevertheless	  decide	  to	  eat	  
them?	  	  Without	  bringing	  in	  some	  entirely	  new	  motivation,	  perhaps	  some	  kind	  of	  duress,	  or	  extreme	  
hunger,	  the	  answer	  is	  surely	  no.	  	  (The	  reader	  is	  invited	  to	  substitute	  some	  food,	  or	  indeed	  non-­‐food,	  
that	  they	  find	  appropriately	  repulsive.)	  	  Nonetheless,	  statement	  (1)	  is	  surely	  true	  in	  this	  case.	  To	  
have	  the	  capacity	  to	  eat	  sprouts	  in	  this	  sense	  just	  means	  having	  the	  ability	  to	  convey	  the	  things	  to	  
one’s	  mouth,	  having	  teeth	  capable	  of	  reducing	  them	  to	  pieces	  small	  enough	  to	  swallow,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  
He	  could	  have	  done	  otherwise—eaten	  the	  sprouts—but	  the	  chance	  of	  this	  happening	  was	  zero.	  	  	  
The	  point	  can	  be	  summarised	  by	  saying	  that	  what	  compatibilism	  insists	  on	  is	  that	  human	  
action,	  certainly	  free	  human	  action,	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  normal	  causal	  order.	  	  If	  the	  normal	  causal	  
order	  is	  deterministic	  then,	  of	  course,	  what	  happens	  could	  not	  but	  have	  happened.	  	  Even	  in	  this	  
case,	  it	  is	  still	  true	  that	  I	  could	  have	  done	  otherwise	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  I	  had	  all	  the	  necessary	  causal	  
capacities	  to	  do	  so;	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  I	  might	  have	  done	  otherwise,	  not	  only	  because	  I	  had	  no	  
reason	  to	  (if	  I	  didn’t),	  but	  also	  because	  in	  a	  deterministic	  world	  it	  is	  never	  the	  case	  that	  anything	  
might	  have	  happened	  except	  what	  actually	  did.	  	  Determinists	  had	  better	  not	  try	  to	  claim	  that	  things	  
might	  have	  gone	  differently,	  and	  if	  freedom	  requires	  this	  possibility,	  they	  had	  better	  admit	  that	  
there	  isn’t	  any.	  	  But	  they	  can,	  at	  least,	  allow	  a	  very	  plausible	  sense	  in	  which	  agents	  may	  claim	  that	  
they	  could	  have	  done	  otherwise.	  
But	  indeterminism,	  or	  anyhow	  the	  kind	  of	  indeterminism	  I	  advocate,	  can	  now	  do	  even	  
better.	  	  On	  my	  view,	  the	  normal	  causal	  order	  is	  a	  patchy	  one.	  	  Sometimes	  it	  tightly	  constrains	  what	  
happens,	  sometimes	  it	  is	  thin	  and	  mutable.	  	  So	  John	  Perry’s	  aversion	  to	  sprouts	  or	  the	  obstinate	  
dedication	  to	  duty	  of	  Hume’s	  gaoler	  constitute	  causally	  well-­‐organised	  features	  of	  the	  world.	  	  On	  the	  
other	  hand	  sometimes	  I	  may	  not	  be	  much	  committed	  to	  any	  one	  course	  of	  action.	  	  My	  causal	  
properties	  may	  not	  determine	  whether	  I	  choose	  an	  orange	  or	  an	  apple;	  which	  is	  just	  to	  say	  my	  
preferences	  for	  fruit	  are	  not	  a	  firmly	  established	  part	  of	  the	  normal	  causal	  order.	  	  Most	  interesting,	  
perhaps,	  are	  cases	  that	  are	  not	  yet	  part	  of	  the	  causal	  order,	  but	  may	  become	  so	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
deliberation.	  	  When	  Caesar	  first	  worries	  whether	  to	  cross	  the	  Rubicon,	  it	  may	  genuinely	  not	  be	  
determined	  whether	  he	  will	  do	  so.	  	  His	  consideration	  of	  the	  issue,	  and	  his	  eventual	  decision,	  convert	  
the	  case	  from	  one	  like	  my	  indifferent	  attitude	  to	  various	  fruit,	  to	  one	  more	  similar	  to	  Perry’s	  stronger	  
views	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  vegetables.	  	  Thus	  deliberation	  and	  decision	  may	  change	  the	  causal	  order;	  the	  
idea,	  contrary	  to	  the	  assumption	  of	  determinism,	  that	  the	  causal	  order	  is	  incomplete	  makes	  it	  
possible	  for	  such	  cogitative	  processes	  to	  make	  a	  difference	  to	  the	  world.	  	  And	  of	  course,	  as	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  Caesar,	  these	  differences	  may	  be	  highly	  significant.	  
As	  is	  characteristic	  of	  this	  topic,	  the	  question	  can	  always	  be	  pushed	  back	  a	  step.	  	  Given	  
Caesar’s	  particular	  history,	  patrician	  education,	  and	  so	  on,	  is	  there	  any	  way	  he	  could	  have	  made	  any	  
other	  decision	  in	  49	  b.c.e.	  than	  to	  cross	  the	  Rubicon?	  	  I	  shall	  remain	  agnostic	  on	  this	  question.	  	  The	  
point	  I	  do	  want	  to	  insist	  on	  is	  that	  the	  fixing	  of	  the	  causal	  order	  that	  led	  to	  Caesar	  and	  his	  legions	  
crossing	  the	  Rubicon	  was	  a	  process	  that	  had	  a	  history,	  culminating	  in	  whatever	  deliberations	  Caesar	  
may	  have	  engaged	  in	  immediately	  prior	  to	  the	  seminal	  event.	  	  It	  may	  be	  that	  the	  relevant	  causal	  
order	  was	  essentially	  fixed	  long	  prior	  to	  this	  time,	  or	  it	  may	  have	  been	  in	  the	  balance	  until	  the	  end.	  	  
These	  are	  details	  for	  historians	  to	  ponder.	  	  The	  defender	  of	  free	  will	  should	  not	  want	  to	  insist	  that	  
the	  agent	  might	  have	  done	  otherwise	  until	  the	  moment	  of	  action,	  even	  if,	  in	  the	  sense	  Perry	  clarifies,	  
they	  still	  could	  have	  done	  otherwise.	  	  This	  insistence	  would	  lead	  us	  towards	  the	  view	  of	  action	  as	  
random	  that	  advocates	  of	  compatibilism	  have	  so	  effectively	  warned	  against.	  	  But	  the	  picture	  of	  
causal	  determination	  crystallising	  out	  against	  an	  as	  yet	  undetermined	  background	  makes	  it	  possible	  
that	  human	  thought,	  commitment,	  moral	  reflection,	  and	  so	  on,	  can	  play	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  the	  
determination	  of	  the	  future.	  	  And	  that,	  surely,	  is	  everything	  that	  the	  defender	  of	  free	  will	  should	  
want.	  
